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Abstract 
This study aims to shed light on the effect of a firm’s geographic location on its voluntary 
disclosure policy. It hypothesizes that a firm’s geographic distance from metropolitan areas 
increases the cost of oversight of managerial actions, which creates incentives for remotely 
located firms to make more voluntary disclosures in their annual reports that improve 
information available to investors and hence mitigate agency conflicts. Based on a sample of 
260 French listed firms spanning the period 2007 to 2010, we find support for our hypothesis 
that as a firm’s distance from the Paris region increases, its level of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports increases as well. This is consistent with the notion that remote firms are likely 
to pre-commit to higher voluntary disclosure so as to reduce oversight costs arising from 
geographic remoteness and mitigate agency conflicts. Our results are robust to alternative 
measures of voluntary disclosure, to several geographic location proxies, and to alternative 
estimation techniques. Collectively, they confirm the positive effect of distance on the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite technological advances, firm geographic location still plays a major role in 
determining investment decisions. Firm proximity to core investors such as mutual funds, 
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hedge funds, investment banks, and financial analysts increases firm visibility and makes the 
task of monitoring by external shareholders less costly. Therefore, proximate investors, both 
individuals and institutions, exhibit a higher propensity to invest in geographically proximate 
firms. Anecdotal evidence shows that many venture capitalists prefer to fund start-up 
companies that are located within a 20–minute drive from their offices. For instance, the 
social networking website Facebook moved its base of operations to Silicon Valley in 2004 to 
benefit from easier access to venture capital; one year later it received its first round of 
financing from Accel Partners, located just four blocks away from (Tian, 2011). 
 
The literature on the relevance of geography in finance has grown since the findings 
of Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) that investors prefer stocks of local companies. It is 
argued that geographic proximity provides investors with better access to firm local 
information, and hence is associated with better investor return (Ivković and Weisbenner, 
2005), more accurate analyst forecasts (Malloy, 2005), and better price formation in 
securities markets (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). More recently, several studies show that a 
firm’s geographic location plays a critical role in shaping corporate behavior, such as firm 
financing, investment, and payout decisions (Loughran, 2008; John et al., 2011; El ghoul et 
al., 2012, among others). 
 
The present paper sheds additional light on the agency motives for voluntary 
disclosure and examines the impact that firm geographic location has on voluntary disclosure 
policy. We argue that firm geographic location affects the ability of outside investors to 
monitor and oversee firm management and, as a consequence, its voluntary disclosure policy. 
We posit that decreased observability of managerial decisions in remotely located firms leads 
to high oversight costs by outside investors, and we hypothesize that remote firms are more 
likely to make more voluntary disclosure to mitigate these costs. Our conjecture is consistent 
with agency theory, suggesting that less monitoring by outside shareholders may encourage 
self-interested managers to engage in corporate misbehavior, such as empire building and 
consuming perks, which in turn reduces firm profitability and destroys its value. To reduce 
potentially high oversight costs incurred by outside shareholders, firms pre-commit to greater 
voluntary disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this perspective, Healy and Palepu 
(2001) discuss how disclosure can reduce agency costs by providing outside investors with a 
tool for monitoring, which improves their ability to relate managerial decisions to firm 
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performance. Considering this line of reasoning, geographic location is likely to matter in 
explaining firm voluntary disclosure choices in the presence of agency costs. 
 
Our key conjecture is that distance to metropolitan areas is associated with increased 
monitoring costs by outside shareholders. Indeed, geographic distance decreases the ability of 
outside shareholders to oversee and monitor managerial actions, thereby increasing oversight 
costs that shareholders face. Unlike local investors, distant investors are less likely to inspect 
remotely located firms and to acquire knowledge about the management and internal 
operations. Gaspar and Massa (2007) argue that shareholders located away from company 
headquarters are less prone to undertake valuable monitoring activities, due to the higher 
costs of understanding the technical aspects of a firm’s internal operations and obtaining 
information about the management culture. 
 
The objective of this research is therefore to generate empirical evidence on the 
relation between a firm’s geographic location and the extent of its voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports, within the agency theory framework. We specifically focus on the decision 
made by insiders to voluntarily disclose additional information in annual reports in a setting 
characterized by greater agency problems. We argue that geographic distance reduces the 
effectiveness of external monitoring by limiting the observability of managerial actions, and 
hence encourages remotely located firms to adopt voluntary disclosure practices in a way that 
improves information available to investors. Our analysis is conducted on French firms, 
which are characterized by a high level of concentrated ownership, and where the controlling 
shareholder is often at the helm of the firm (Faccio and Lang, 2002). In such an environment, 
the main agency problem arises between dominant shareholders and minority investors, 
rather than between managers and shareholders. Using geographic remoteness as a proxy for 
monitoring costs, we investigate the impact of firm geographic location on its voluntary 
disclosure policy in a setting characterized by greater agency problems between controlling 
and minority shareholders. 
 
We use the distance between corporate headquarters and the Paris region to proxy for 
monitoring costs. We suggest that firms headquartered inside the Paris region have many 
potential investors nearby, while remotely located firms have fewer investors in their vicinity. 
Therefore, firms headquartered in and around the Paris region are expected to have lower 
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monitoring costs, whereas firms headquartered far away from the Paris region are expected to 
have higher monitoring costs. 
 
The present study is conducted in the French context, which presents an interesting, if 
not unique, setting for addressing the effect of distance on voluntary disclosure. First, 
ongoing corporate transparency challenges have urged French authorities to draw up several 
guidelines to encourage listed firms to increase their voluntary disclosure, such as Bouton 
report and Afep–Medef codes on corporate governance. French firms are, however, typically 
controlled by dominant shareholders who are more willing to take advantage of firm opacity 
to obtain private benefits of control. These opposite forces at work on corporate transparency 
make it interesting to address the issue of voluntary disclosure in France. Second, except for 
the study of Boubaker et al. (2015) examining the effect of geography on corporate cash 
holdings, there is no research linking geography and corporate practices in the French 
context. Different from the U.S. featuring metropolitan decentralization, the Paris region is 
considered as the unique influential metropolitan area in France (Guillain and Le Gallo, 
2010). All these factors make of France a suitable laboratory for examining how remoteness 
from metropolitan areas can affect the extent of voluntary disclosure.   
 
To test the impact of firm location on the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports, we use a sample of 1,040 firm–year observations for 260 French listed firms 
spanning the period 2007 to 2010. We hand-collect data on voluntary disclosure from firms’ 
annual reports. We analyze the content of the annual reports of sampled firms to determine 
the level of voluntary disclosure of each company based on a self-constructed index 
following prior voluntary disclosure studies. We find that as firms’ distance from the Paris 
region increases, the extent of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports increases. This 
result supports our hypothesis that greater distances from metropolitan areas increase 
information distortions in remotely located firms, which reduces the observability of 
managerial actions to shareholders. Thus, remote firms have greater incentive to voluntarily 
disclose more information in their annual reports to improve information available to 
investors and increase firm value. Moreover, our results are robust to alternative variable 
definitions and to alternative estimation techniques. 
 
This research contributes to the literature on the effect of geographic proximity on 
corporate finance decisions. It empirically tests the impact that a firm’s location has on its 
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voluntary disclosure policy. There are a handful of papers in the corporate finance literature 
that examine the relevance of geography on corporate policies. For instance, Loughran (2008) 
highlights that rural firms are less likely to conduct seasoned equity offerings compared to 
urban firms, since geographic remoteness inhibits outside investors, who are at a significant 
information disadvantage regarding remotely located firms, from buying rural stocks in the 
event of an offering. At the same time, Kedia et al. (2008) report that acquirers earn 
significantly higher returns in geographically proximate transactions. Landier et al. (2009) 
highlight the importance of a firm’s geographic dispersion on its labor and divestiture 
policies. Almazan et al. (2010) examine the impact of firm location on its acquisition and 
financing choices. These authors report that firms located in industry clusters tend to have 
more investment opportunities, and require increased cash to undertake more acquisitions. 
 
Second, our research contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by generating 
evidence on the impact of firm geographic location on voluntary disclosure practices. 
Voluntary disclosure is deemed to improve information available to investors, which allows 
them to better monitor managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Information problems are 
likely to be greater in remotely located firms, due to the increased monitoring costs in remote 
locations. Our results show that distant firms are more likely to disclose additional 
information in annual reports to increase information flow in the market and, hence, mitigate 
monitoring costs by outside investors. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the 
first to examine the impact of firm location on voluntary disclosure policies in an agency 
theory framework. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and develops research hypothesis. Section 3 describes data and variables’ construction. 
Section 4 presents methodology, results of multivariate analysis, and robustness checks. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
This study is motivated by a growing literature on the economic importance of 
geographic proximity. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) analyze the effect of distance on 
investment performance and find that U.S. mutual fund managers are better at picking stocks 
of firms located in their vicinity than stocks of firms located farther away. Hau (2001) note 
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that German traders located in proximity to corporate headquarters outperform other traders, 
since they have better access to first-hand and low-cost information about corporate policies. 
In the same vein, Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) report that individual investors exhibit a 
strong preference for local stocks than mutual fund managers. In the area of equity analysis, 
Malloy (2005) highlights the role of geographic proximity in improving the performance of 
financial analysts. The author finds that geographically proximate analysts produce more 
accurate earnings forecasts, update their forecasts more frequently, and have a greater impact 
on stock prices than distant analysts. O'Brien and Tan (2015) indicate that remotely located 
firms that go public are more inclined to use local analyst coverage in a way to increase 
visibility with other analysts and institutional investors. Li and Zhao (2016) find evidence 
that stock returns have stronger comovement with the returns of nearby firms than with those 
of distant firms. Focusing on bank sector, Hollander and Verriest (2016) document that 
increased distance constraints faced by lenders in acquiring borrower information lead to 
more restrictive bank loan contracts. 
 
Unlike the above-mentioned studies, our research analyzes the effect of a firm’s 
geographic location on the extent of voluntary disclosure in its annual reports. In particular, it 
focuses on how geographic remoteness from metropolitan areas can be conducive to poor 
information environment, hence encouraging corporate insiders to voluntarily disclose 
additional information as a way that mitigates this adverse location effect. 
 
Consistent with the agency theory, voluntary disclosure plays an important role in 
mitigating the conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders. Comprehensive empirical 
studies support the theoretical prediction on the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in 
reducing agency costs. Healy and Palepu (2001) review the disclosure literature and report 
that voluntary disclosure provides outside investors with a useful monitoring tool that helps 
to mitigate agency problems and effectively monitor managerial decisions. Ali et al. (2007) 
analyze disclosure practices of U.S. firms and show evidence that family firms facing severe 
agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders carry out better financial 
disclosure compared to non-family firms. Boubaker et al. (2014) find that, consistent with the 
alignment hypothesis, insiders of French firms have less incentives to withdraw firm-specific 
information or to hoard bad news. Boubaker et al. (2015) show that controlling shareholders 
accumulate more cash into private benefits when their firms are headquartered outside the 
Paris region, suggesting that geographic remoteness can be conducive to severe agency 
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problems. Abdulkadir and Schwienbacher (2016) stress that voluntary disclosure on 
investments in innovative startups is strategically used by large firms to signal the market.  
 
There is empirical evidence in support of the view that geographic distance from a 
firm’s headquarters impacts monitoring and oversight costs of the management team. A 
potential explanation of this view is that, as firm distance from metropolitan areas increases, 
the observability of managerial investment decisions decreases, hence making monitoring 
costly for outside investors. Petersen and Rajan (2002) study the concept of physical distance 
in the context of commercial banks’ lending to small companies and find evidence that banks 
are more reluctant to provide credit to more distant firms, since lower visibility and difficulty 
in maintaining close formal and informal relationships with borrowers are more likely at 
greater distances. Mian (2006) highlights that foreign banks shy away from lending to 
domestic banks that require relational contracting and explains that this reluctance is related 
to additional agency costs that arise from cultural differences and geographic remoteness. 
Chen et al. (2010) document that venture capital firms are likely to locate in metropolitan 
areas with the highest concentration of profitable investments, so that they can benefit from 
decreased costs of oversight and can easily monitor managerial actions of their portfolios 
companies. John et al. (2011) report that geographic distance from U.S. metropolitan areas 
increases the cost of shareholder oversight of managerial actions, hence incentivizing remote 
firms facing free cash flow problems to increase their dividend payouts as a way to mitigate 
such costs. Ayers et al. (2011) show that managers are more likely to use opportunistic 
reporting discretion when the monitoring institutions are located at a greater distance from 
the firm’s headquarters. In a similar vein, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) contend that local 
institutional investors are effective monitors of corporate behavior, since geographic 
proximity to firms’ headquarters provides investors with better ability to assess managerial 
actions and inspect firm operations. Boubakri et al. (2016) find that decreased remoteness 
from financial centers of metropolitan areas is associated with increased foreign investors’ 
ownership, suggesting that increased monitoring of management mitigates the adverse effect 
of geographic remoteness. 
 
Based on these arguments, we claim that geographic distance increases information 
distortions and, hence, decreases the observability of managerial actions to outside investors. 
Voluntary disclosure improves information available to investors, hence serving as an 
effective tool for reducing costs of monitoring management. Agency theory posits that 
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insiders have incentives to incur bonding costs and provide valuable firm-level information to 
outside investors, since they can produce information about their activities at lower cost. 
Accordingly, remotely located firms’ awareness of the difficulty of monitoring by outside 
shareholders strengthens their incentives to undertake higher firm-level voluntary disclosure. 
Hence, we expect that as firm distance from the Paris region increases, the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases as well, ceteris paribus. Therefore, we expect 
that the extent of voluntary disclosure increases with distance from the Paris region. 
 
3. Data and variables construction 
This section describes the sample selection procedure, lists our data sources, and 
discusses construction of the voluntary disclosure index and control variables, as well as the 
results of the univariate analysis. 
3.1. Data sources and sample selection procedure 
Our initial sample encompasses all French listed firms appearing in the Worldscope 
database in the period 2007–2010. Firm annual reports are downloaded from the website of 
the French market authorities (www.amf–france.org) as well as from firms’ websites. Data on 
latitudes and longitudes of the location of the firms’ headquarters are collected from Maps of 
World (www.mapsofworld.com). Data on alternative measures of distance are obtained from 
the www.viamichelin.com website. Data on analyst following are obtained from the 
Historical Institutional Broker Estimation System (IBES) International database. All other 
financial data are obtained from the Worldscope database. 
 
The final sample of our study is constructed as follows. First, as in previous studies, 
we exclude regulated utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) and financial firms (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999), because such firms operate in an environment with specific 
legal and regulatory requirements. Second, we rule out firms that are headquartered in the 
French Overseas Departments and Territories, because the considerable distances between 
these regions and the Paris region may distort the location analysis. Finally, we discard 
delisted firms and those with missing financial data. The final sample consists of 260 firms 
with 1,040 firm–year observations covering the period 2007 to 2010 with complete data for 
analysis. 
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3.1.1. Measurement of the voluntary disclosure index 
To measure the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of French listed firms, 
we use a self-constructed index based on prior voluntary disclosure literature (e.g., Meek, 
Roberts and Gray, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003). Previous studies on voluntary 
disclosure use different proxies for the overall level of disclosure, such as earnings forecasts 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Chen et al., 2008), analyst disclosure ratings (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Healy et al., 1999), and annual report disclosures (Botosan, 1997; 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). In the current research, we focus on the latter proxy, consistent 
with the findings of Lang and Lundholm (1993) that annual report disclosure levels are 
positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other avenues, such as 
investor relations and other publications. 
 
The voluntary disclosure index contains 95 discretionary items and is reported in 
Appendix 1. Index items fall into two categories: governance information and financial 
information. Governance information includes matters that cover boards of directors, 
compensation committees, and audit committees. Financial information includes matters such 
as stock price information, projected information, and other financial data. As in Cooke 
(1992), content analysis was conducted to identify the presence of any information in annual 
reports. A dichotomous procedure was applied in which an item scores 1 if it is disclosed, 
zero if it is not disclosed, and N/A if it is not applicable. The voluntary disclosure index was 
compiled using the relative approach; DSCORE is the sum of scores awarded for each item in 
the index divided by the maximum possible score. The latter was calculated after excluding 
non-applicable items. Thus, companies are not penalized if a disclosure item is not relevant to 
it (e.g., some firms have no compensation committee or audit committee). The disclosure 
index is derived from the following formula: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗max�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗�95𝑖𝑖=1         (1) 
where SCOREj is the total number of points awarded to firm j, and max (SCOREj) is the 
maximum score awarded to firm j after excluding all irrelevant items for that firm. Hence, 
DSCOREj is our measure of the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of French 
firms, calculated as the total number of items awarded to each firm in our sample divided by 
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the maximum possible score for each firm. Similarly, we construct the governance 
information score, GSCORE, and the financial information score, FSCORE. 
 
Consistent with prior research on voluntary disclosure, the use of self-constructed 
indices has some limitations. Botosan (1997) documents that a self-constructed index is a 
useful research method that gives strong and corroborative results. However, this 
methodology requires subjective assessment by data collectors, which constitutes its main 
limitation. Consequently, it is important to assess the validity of our self-constructed index. 
First, we follow a number of researchers (Botosan, 1997; Gul and Leung, 2004) and use 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) to measure the internal consistency of our 
proxy of voluntary disclosure. This tool is used to assess the degree to which correlation 
among the categories is attenuated due to random error. Generally, an alpha of 0.8 is a good 
indicator that correlation is attenuated very little by random measurement error. In our case, 
we find that Cronbach’s alpha for the two categories of the disclosure index is 0.56, 
suggesting that random measurement error can reduce the power of the empirical tests in our 
study. Following Botosan (1997), we may accept a relatively low Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha.1  
 
Second, we examine the correlation of our proxy of voluntary disclosure DSCORE 
and various firm characteristics, consistent with prior research. We find that DSCORE is 
positively and significantly associated with firm size, leverage, profitability, audit firm size, 
analyst following, market-to-book ratio, cross-listing, and security issuance. This finding is 
consistent with prior research on voluntary disclosure that examines the association between 
disclosure level in annual reports and various firm characteristics, as analyzed in Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999). Overall, the validity of DSCORE is supported by its correlation with various 
firm characteristics documented in prior research and by Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. 
3.1.2. Measurement of a firm’s geographic location 
Consistent with prior research, we use a firm’s headquarters as a proxy for its location 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005; Kang and Kim, 2008). 
Davis and Henderson (2008) show that corporate headquarters are considered the center of 
information exchange between the firm and its investors. We gauge the distance from a 
                                                          
1 Botosan (1997) finds a relatively low alpha of 0.64, but this author considers the disclosure measure valid. 
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firm’s headquarters to the Paris region as a metric of its location. The Paris region is the 
wealthiest and most populous region in France. It is home to large French corporations and a 
large number of financial operators, such as financial analysts, investment banks, mutual 
funds, pension funds, and brokerage houses (Guillain and Le Gallo, 2010). According to a 
recent survey conducted by Ernst & Young, the Paris region hosts the headquarters of 67 of 
French firms on the Forbes 2000 list.2 Further, this region contains the major business and 
financial districts in France, with approximately 45 million square meters of office space 
(Halbert, 2004). The Paris metropolitan area is composed of eight departments centered on its 
innermost department and capital, Paris. The inner ring consists of three departments namely 
Haut-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, and Val-de-Marne, and the outer ring consists of four 
departments namely Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines, Essonne, and Val-de-Oise. Overall, according 
to the economic importance of the Paris region in France, we consider it a reference point to 
measure our three proxies of geographic location used in the empirical analysis. 
 
To determine the firm’s geographic location, we first obtain the location of the 
headquarters of each firm in our sample using the four-digit postal code of the county in 
which the firm is headquartered. Then, we construct our three proxies of geographic location. 
First, we measure the variable DISTANCE, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
distance in kilometers between the firm’s headquarters and the Paris region. Following Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999), we use the following formula to measure the distance between two 
points, a and b: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷[𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 (𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎) ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷(𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎) ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷(𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎) ∗  𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 (𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎) +  𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷(𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎) ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎) ∗  𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷(𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎) ∗  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎) +  sin (𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎) ∗  sin (𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎)] ∗  2 Л r 360�          (2) 
 
where (lat) and (long) are latitudes and longitudes (measured in degrees) of the Paris region 
and firm headquarters locations, and r is the radius of the earth (6378 km). 
 
Second, we compute the variable ROAD DISTANCE as the natural logarithm of one 
plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. Our choice of road distance is motivated 
by the recent study of Mento (2009), who finds that the automobile is still a primary mode of 
                                                          
2 Ernst & Young “European Headquarters: Location decisions” survey, 2009. 
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transportation, suggesting the importance of highways in facilitating accessibility to a given 
city. 
 
Third, we code a dummy variable, which we label OUTSIDE_PARIS, to take the 
value 1 if the firm is headquartered outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. As 
mentioned above, the Paris metropolitan area is composed of eight departments; we consider 
them our reference point to gauge this variable. Firms are considered to be located in the 
Paris region if they are located in one of the eight departments of Paris (75), Haut-de-Seine 
(92), Seine-Saint-Denis (93), Val-de-Marne (94), Seine-et-Marne (77), Yvelines (78), 
Essonne (78), and Val-de-Oise (95). 
3.1.3. Control variables 
3.1.3.1. Firm size 
Prior studies document a positive association between firm size and the extent of 
disclosure in annual reports (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Raffournier, 1995). From the agency 
theory standpoint, large firms have higher agency costs. Thus, they are more likely to 
disclose more information to reduce these costs. In addition, the political cost theory suggests 
that large firms are generally exposed to political attacks and pressures from government and 
regulatory bodies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, large firms may reduce these 
actions through voluntary disclosure. Finally, the benefit cost theory argues that large firms 
incur lower disclosure costs because they already produce information for internal purposes, 
explaining their incentives to disclose more information than small firms, which are generally 
more reluctant to disclose additional information for fear of competitors (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971). Overall, these arguments suggest a positive relation between firm size and voluntary 
disclosure. We measure firm size (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
3.1.3.2. Leverage 
Firms with more debt in their capital structure need higher disclosure levels to reduce 
agency costs of debt. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers may use firm free 
cash flow to overinvest in inefficient projects (Jensen, 1986). Consequently, shareholders can 
monitor self-interested managers and reduce free cash flow at their disposal through issuing 
debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as debt increases, agency costs between 
shareholders and bondholders increase, such as costs associated with asset substitution and 
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underinvestment problems. Bondholders will then demand greater disclosure. This may lead 
to a positive association between leverage and voluntary disclosure, consistent with the 
findings of Ahmed and Courtis (1999) that 29 studies on voluntary disclosure confirm a 
positive relation between disclosure level and leverage. 
However, a negative association between leverage and disclosure level is also 
expected (Wallace et al., 1994; Eng and Mak, 2003). As mentioned above, leverage can 
reduce the free cash flow problem and act as a monitoring mechanism to the manager-
shareholder relation. In addition, bondholders can mitigate agency costs of debt through bond 
covenants rather than increased disclosure in annual reports (Jensen, 1986). Consequently, 
the need for voluntary disclosure can be substituted by the presence of debt. In sum, the 
results of previous studies are mixed and hence no directional relation between leverage and 
disclosure level can be conjectured. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured as the ratio of total 
debt to common equity. 
3.1.3.3. Profitability 
Several studies show the existence of a positive relation between profitability and 
corporate disclosure. Agency theory suggests that managers of more profitable firms are 
more likely to disclose additional information to support the continuance of their positions 
and compensation (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). According to signaling theory, Ng and Koh 
(1994) argue that highly profitable firms are more visible to the public and subject to greater 
public scrutiny, prompting greater disclosure by these firms to avoid external regulation. 
However, Wallace and Naser (1995) report a significant negative relation between 
profitability and disclosure level. Given that the empirical evidence on the effect of 
profitability on the extent of corporate disclosure is mixed, no directional relation is expected. 
Profitability (ROA) is proxied by firm return on assets computed as the ratio of earnings 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
3.1.3.4. Audit firm size 
For a host of reasons, audit firm size is likely to be positively associated with 
disclosure level. First, agency theory suggests that high quality audits may mitigate agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders. Large audit firms are more likely to be 
independent, and hence they can constrain managers to make more informative disclosure, 
that is, to conform to the standards (DeAngelo, 1981). Second, big auditors may induce 
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companies to enhance the quality and credibility of information presented in their annual 
reports to preserve their reputations (Firth, 1979). Finally, signaling theory may also explain 
the relation between auditor size and disclosure. Managers that hire large auditors may signal 
to the market their willingness to disclose high quality information (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Overall, we expect a positive relation between audit firm size and disclosure level. We 
control for audit firm size by introducing a dummy variable (BIG4) equal to 1 if the firm’s 
accountants are certified by at least one Big Four accounting firm, and zero otherwise. 
3.1.3.5. Analyst following 
Prior studies on disclosure examine the relation between analyst following and 
corporate disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Analyst following can explain the 
level of disclosure by companies. Since firms with greater analyst following face greater 
demand for information by analysts, they are more likely to disclose additional information. 
It is expected that the extent of voluntary disclosure increases with the number of analysts 
following the firm. We measure analyst following (ANALYST) as the number of analysts 
following the firm in year t. 
3.1.3.6. Cross-listing 
Several studies document a positive association between cross-listing and disclosure 
level (Wallace et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995). Firms with foreign listings face additional 
capital market pressures, thus they must comply with foreign capital market rules concerning 
the additional information required in their annual reports. In addition, foreign investors are 
more stringent about the monitoring of management and require additional information to 
mitigate the information asymmetry between managers and external shareholders. According 
to the capital need hypothesis, Cooke (1992) suggests that firms listed on foreign markets 
face higher competition for capital with domestically listed enterprises. Consequently, they 
have greater incentives to disclose information to enhance their transparency, and hence raise 
capital at lower costs. As a result, we expect that cross-listed firms exhibit greater voluntary 
disclosure. To control for cross-listing, we introduce a dummy variable (XLIST) that takes the 
value 1 if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise. 
3.1.3.7. Liquidity 
Prior research suggests that liquidity ratios may determine the disclosure levels in 
annual reports (Cooke 1989 a,b). Liquidity ratios are used to assess the financial soundness of 
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a firm. The higher the ratio, the greater the ability of a firm to meet its current obligations, 
hence, the more likely it is to disclose additional information to signal its better performance. 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that firms with weak liquidity ratios have greater 
incentive to disclose more information, to give additional details about their weak 
performance and to reassure investors (Wallace et al., 1994). Another line of support for this 
negative relation comes from the agency theory prediction. Agency costs increase with the 
proportion of debt in a firm’s capital structure, suggesting that the higher the liquidity ratio, 
the lower the proportion of debt, and hence firms need less disclosure to mitigate agency 
costs of debt. Overall, given the mixed results documented in prior research, no directional 
relation is expected. Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) is measured as the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities. 
3.1.3.8. Market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio is shown in previous research as a determinant of the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. It is commonly used to proxy for the investment opportunity set and the 
associated information asymmetry between management and investors. Nagar et al., (2003) 
document a positive association between market-to-book ratio and disclosure level, 
explaining the effectiveness of disclosure in mitigating the greater information asymmetry in 
high market-to-book ratio firms. Hence, there may be greater disclosure in high market-to-
book ratio firms. Market-to-book ratio (MB) is measured as the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity. 
3.1.3.9. Security issuance 
Several studies provide evidence that a firm’s external financing need determines its 
level of voluntary disclosure. Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995) find that firms raising 
external funds have greater incentives to make voluntary disclosures. In another study, Lang 
and Lundholm (1993) show that analyst ratings of disclosures increase with the possibility 
that firms issue securities in the current or future periods. Since the lack of information prior 
to raising external capital may be interpreted as a bad signal, managers are more likely to 
disclose all information available, to benefit from cheaper external financing. Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) show evidence that firms that make equity offerings increase their 
disclosure activity six months before the offering to reduce their cost of capital. These 
findings suggest that debt and equity offerings are positively associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Hence, we expect that voluntary disclosure increases with the need for 
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external financing. We control for firms’ external financing motivation using a dummy 
variable (ISSUE) which equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in year t or the 
two years following year t, and zero otherwise. 
3.1.3.10. Industry dummies 
It has been argued that levels of disclosure in corporate annual reports are not likely to 
be identical throughout all sectors of the economy. Indeed, some industries are more likely to 
disclose additional information than others, for a number of reasons. For instance, Cooke 
(1989) reports historical reasons for differences in the level of disclosure for Swedish 
companies. Cooke (1992) finds that the difference in disclosure level between Japanese 
manufacturing firms and non-manufacturing firms is due to the economic importance of this 
sector in the economy. Proprietary costs and accounting quality may also constitute industry-
specific factors that determine the level of disclosure across industries. In sum, we introduce 
industry dummies in the regressions to control for potential differences in disclosure levels 
across industries. Industries are identified using the Campbell (1996) classification. 
3.1.3.11. Year dummies 
We introduce year dummies in all regressions of our model to control for time effects 
that manifest in changes in macroeconomic conditions, which in turn influence firm 
voluntary disclosure decisions. 
Appendix 2 summarizes the definition of the variables used in the present study. 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
 
Table 1 (Panel A) displays characteristics of the sample firms and shows their 
distributions across industries using the Campbell (1996) grouping. Three industries 
dominate the sample: services (0.30), consumer durables (0.1769), and capital goods 
(0.1038). 
 
Descriptive statistics of our study variables are reported in Table 1 (Panel B). The 
average (median) percentage of the total voluntarily disclosed items, DSCORE, is 0.39 (0.41), 
with a wide range from a minimum of 0.04 to a maximum of 0.70. The standard deviation of 
DSCORE is 0.13. The mean (median) of GSCORE and FSCORE are 0.42 (0.42) and 0.31 
17 
 
(0.33), respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.15 for the governance information and 
0.11 for the financial information. Overall, these results suggest that the sample firms present 
large variability with respect to governance information, financial information, and the total 
disclosure index. Table 1 (Panel B) also provides descriptive statistics on the independent 
variables. The mean (median) distance from a firm’s headquarters to the Paris region is 
195.27 (26.25) kilometers with standard deviation of 224.45 kilometers. The mean (median) 
of road distance is 234.67 (34.50) kilometers with standard deviation of 271.09 kilometers, 
implying large variation in these two measures of geographic distance. 
[Insert Table 1about here] 
 
Table 2 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations between voluntary disclosure 
score, geographic location measures, and control variables. There is a strong association 
between our disclosure score and different measures of distance between corporate 
headquarters and the Paris region. We find that the variables DISTANCE, ROAD DISTANCE, 
and OUTSIDE_PARIS are highly positively associated with the voluntary disclosure score, 
thus supporting our prediction of a positive location effect on voluntary disclosure. The 
analysis also shows that disclosure score is positively associated with firm size, leverage, 
profitability, audit firm size, analyst following, cross-listing, and security issuance, and 
negatively associated with firm liquidity. These results are consistent with prior research on 
voluntary disclosure, as discussed in Ahmed and Courtis (1999), and hence support our 
measure of voluntary disclosure. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Examining Table 2, we note that multicollinearity is not a serious concern, since the 
correlation coefficients between the independent variables are small except for the three 
geographic location measures. This result does not constitute a problem, because we 
introduce these variables one by one in the estimation regressions. An alternative way to test 
for multicollinearity is to compute the variance inflation factor (VIF). We find that the VIFs 
for all independent variables in our baseline model are below the rule of thumb threshold of 
10 (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006). Consequently, we argue that multicollinearity is not a serious 
concern and that the empirical analysis can be interpreted with greater confidence. 
 
Table 3 reports mean comparison tests of the level of voluntary disclosure between 
two groups of firms separated each time according to their distance to the Paris region and 
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firm characteristics. The initial sample is partitioned into two groups based on firm location 
and firm characteristics: whether a firm is outside or inside the Paris region (variable 
OUTSIDE_PARIS); whether a firm’s distance to the Paris region is above or below median 
levels (variable DISTANCE_D); whether a firm’s road distance to the Paris region is above or 
below the median level (variable ROAD DISTANCE_D); and finally whether firm 
characteristics are above or below their median levels. We find that voluntary disclosure is 
higher for firms located outside the Paris region compared with those inside the Paris region 
(mean 0.4085 versus 0.3815). We also document that firms that are distant to the Paris region 
exhibit higher levels of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports than their nearby 
counterparts (a mean of 0.4088 versus 0.3812). We obtain similar results when we consider 
the road distance to the Paris region. Our interpretation is that voluntary disclosure by 
remotely located firms is important, since distant shareholders are more likely to face high 
oversight costs that can be limited by increasing information available to investors.  
 
Table 3 also documents the importance of the control variables used in our analysis. 
In brief, the results indicate that voluntary disclosure is positively and significantly associated 
with firm size, leverage, audit firm size, cross-listing, market-to-book ratio, and security 
issuance variables, consistent with prior research. Although our results concerning the 
relation between voluntary disclosure and different geographic location proxies is consistent 
with our theoretical prediction, it is worth noting that multivariate analysis would provide 
additional insights into how the geographic distance to the Paris region determines voluntary 
disclosure by French listed firms. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Methodology and empirical results 
This section explains the methodology used to test our hypothesis of a positive 
association between the geographic distance to the Paris region and voluntary disclosure. We 
supplement the findings of the univariate analysis by running multivariate regressions. 
Finally, we extend our findings to cover a number of additional tests and robustness checks. 
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4.1. Baseline model specification 
To test our research hypothesis, we estimate the following model specification using a 
linear multiple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors that are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level:  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ (𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) +   𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 +  𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 +  𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺4 +   𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗ 𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 +  𝛽𝛽9 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 +  𝛽𝛽10 ∗
𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 +  𝛽𝛽11(𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) +  𝛽𝛽12 ∗  (𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   (3) 
 
where GEOGRAPHY stands for each of the proxies of geographic location: distance in 
kilometers to the Paris region (DISTANCE); road distance in kilometers to the Paris region 
(ROAD DISTANCE); and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is located 
outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise (OUTSIDE_PARIS). These variables are 
introduced one by one in the model. The multivariate regression also controls for firm 
characteristics that are potentially correlated with voluntary disclosure, as documented in 
previous research. We control for firm size, leverage, profitability, audit firm size, analyst 
following, cross-listing, liquidity, market-to-book ratio, and security issuance. Industry 
dummies are included in the model, since voluntary disclosure varies from one industry to 
another (Wallace et al., 1994). Finally, we introduce year dummies to address time trend 
effects that can influence firm voluntary disclosure policies. 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the results of the effect of geography on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. For each of the distance variable tests, we run three regressions in which we use 
the total disclosure score and its two subgroups as the dependent variable. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Columns 1–3 concern the regressions using the variable DISTANCE as the geographic 
location proxy. We find that DISTANCE is strongly associated with the total disclosure score 
and its two subcategories (positive and significant at the 0.01 level), supporting the prediction 
of our hypothesis that firms located far away from the Paris region have higher levels of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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We find similar results in columns 4–6 by using ROAD DISTANCE to the Paris region 
as a proxy for geographic location. The coefficient of the variable ROAD DISTANCE is also 
positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Hence, the distance between a firm’s headquarters 
and the Paris region seems to positively affect the level of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. These findings suggest that firms tend to disclose more information when they are 
located far from France’s major metropolitan areas. This result is consistent with the view 
that geographic distance is associated with higher monitoring costs, thereby leading firms 
located in remote areas to voluntarily disclose more information to make managerial actions 
more observable. 
 
Finally, we introduce a dummy variable OUTSIDE_PARIS, which takes the value 1 if 
the firm is located outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. The results are reported in 
columns 7–9 for total disclosure score, the governance information subgroup, and the 
financial information subgroup, respectively. We continue to find supporting evidence at the 
1% level for the prediction from our hypothesis that remotely located firms use more 
voluntary disclosure to improve information available to distant investors. The variable 
OUTSIDE_PARIS also exhibits positive coefficients (0.0494, 0.0497, and 0.0422) for the 
total disclosure score, the governance information subgroup, and the financial information 
subgroup, respectively; all are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
In summary, the results reported in Table 4 are consistent with our prediction that 
firms located far from the Paris region incur higher monitoring costs because the 
observability of managerial investment decisions decreases with distance. Hence, remote 
firms provide more voluntary disclosure in their annual reports to reduce monitoring costs 
and attract potential investors, who are most often located in the Paris region. Alternatively, 
proximity to metropolitan areas seems to lower the need for voluntary disclosure, because 
most investors are located in metropolitan areas and can oversee and monitor nearby 
companies at lower cost. 
 
Turning to the effect of control variables on voluntary disclosure level, Table 4 shows 
that all control variables are significant, with their predicted signs except for two variables, 
ROA and LIQUIDITY. The variable SIZE is positively and significantly associated with total 
disclosure score, as well as with the disclosure of information subgroups. The 
variables BIG4, XLIST, MB, and ISSUE exhibit positive and statistically significant (at the 
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0.01 level) signs, suggesting that firms increase their disclosure level, respectively, when they 
are audited by Big Four companies, when they are listed on foreign stock exchanges, when 
they have high growth opportunities, and when they need external capital. These results are 
consistent with our predictions in the first section and with most prior research on voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).  
 
The total voluntary disclosure score, DSCORE, is also positively and significantly (at 
the 0.10 level) associated with ANALYST, suggesting that companies that are followed by a 
greater number of analysts disclose more information in their annual reports to meet the 
information needs of those analysts. LEVERAGE is negative and significant at the 0.01 level 
for all regressions presented in Table 4, supporting the prediction that leverage may act as a 
monitoring mechanism substituting for the role of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, we find 
that LIQUIDITY is negative and statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) for the financial 
information score, FSCORE, in all regressions, but it is not significant for the governance 
information score, GSCORE, and the overall disclosure score, DSCORE, In sum, the results 
on the control variables are consistent with the prior findings of disclosure studies, which 
document that mixed results may be explained by differences in the construction of the 
disclosure index, differences in the definition of the explanatory variables, and differences in 
research design (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).  
 
The adjusted R2 for the level of overall disclosure is about 0.27. As for the 
information subgroups, the adjusted R2  ranges from 0.24 for governance information to 0.14 
for financial information. Hence, these values suggest that the regression models explain the 
variation in voluntary disclosures not only for the total score, but also for the information 
subgroups. Overall, the multivariate analysis offers additional insights into the effect of 
geographic location on voluntary disclosure level, and supports the prediction of our 
hypothesis that voluntary disclosure increases with distance to the Paris region. 
 
4.3. Additional tests and robustness checks 
To further explore the validity of our hypothesis of a positive relation between 
geographic location and voluntary disclosure, we perform a series of sensitivity tests 
consistent with those documented in the literature. Notably, we employ alternative measures 
of the dependent and independent variables. We also use alternative statistical approaches. 
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4.3.1. Alternative measures of the dependent variable 
The dependent variables in our model are the total voluntary disclosure index, 
DSCORE, and its two subgroups, GSCORE and FSCORE. We follow prior research on 
disclosure and examine the nature of the data. It is argued that any research using self-
constructed disclosure indexes should be aware of the data structure, and hence it needs to 
examine the effects of potential non-normality of the data (Cooke, 1989). Thus, we perform a 
Jarque and Bera (1980) test of normality. This test rejects, in our case, the normality of the 
total disclosure score and its two subgroups. We then perform a natural logarithm 
transformation to these scores to meet the OLS assumptions by bringing the residuals of the 
regression closer to a normal distribution.  
 
Table 5 displays the results of the regressions using the natural logarithm of the 
disclosure scores as the dependent variable. We provide further evidence on the positive 
association between the different proxies of geographic location and voluntary disclosure 
level. As for the control variables, we also find results similar to those in previous 
regressions, except for ANALYST, which becomes not statistically significant, and 
LIQUIDITY, which becomes statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Second, compared to the Botosan (1997) checklist over a single industry, our sample 
spans 10 industries. Thus, we proxy for our dependent variables using industry-adjusted 
disclosure scores to take into account the industry-specific effects, such as proprietary costs, 
on disclosure level. The disclosure scores are industry-adjusted by computing the average 
disclosure score for each industry and then subtracting the industry average score from the 
initial score for each firm. ADSCORE is the adjusted overall disclosure score, ADGOV is the 
industry-adjusted governance score, and ADFIN is the adjusted financial score. Table 6 
displays the results of the regressions using industry-adjusted scores as the dependent 
variable. We find that the location effect is always positive and statistically significant at 
better than the 0.01 level. All control variables have the same signs as our baseline model 
except for LIQUIDITY, which becomes statistically significant. 
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4.3.2. Alternative geographic location proxies 
In this section, we run additional tests to analyze whether our results hinge on the 
geographic location proxies. We use two alternative proxies for distance: DISTANCE100, 
defined as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located more than 100 kilometers 
from the Paris region, and zero otherwise (columns 1–3); and DISTANCE250, defined as a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located more than 250 kilometers from the Paris 
region, and zero otherwise (columns 4–6).  
 
Table 7 displays the results of the regressions using these two alternative geographic 
location proxies. We find that the coefficients on the geographic measures continue to exhibit 
a positive and statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) relation between geography and 
voluntary disclosure. This result reinforces that the link between firm location and voluntary 
disclosure level is not driven by how we gauge distance. All control variables have the same 
signs as in the baseline model. Overall, our results are robust to alternative measures of 
geographic location. 
 
4.3.3. Alternative statistical approaches 
We perform additional tests to verify the robustness of our results. First, the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) estimation method is used to control for potential cross-sectional 
dependence in the data, which might yield biased estimates of standard errors, and hence can 
increase the risk of incorrect statistical inferences. This method consists of two steps. First, 
for each single time-period, a cross-sectional regression is performed. Second, the final 
coefficient estimates are obtained as the average of the first-step coefficient estimates.  
 
The regression results are reported in columns 1–3 of Table 8. We further find that the 
impact of firm geographic location on voluntary disclosure level is persistently positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Similarly, we estimate our model using the Fama-
MacBeth with Newey–West standard errors (columns 4–6). This approach is designed to 
account for serial autocorrelation using a first order autoregressive process (Petersen, 2009). 
Our findings are largely consistent with our prediction that distant firms provide more 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports to increase information available to investors and 
thus reduce management monitoring costs. 
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Further, we estimate a random effects regression that permits us to exploit the panel 
structure of the data and allows for time-invariant geographic variables (columns 7–9). We 
find again a strong positive relation between geographic location and disclosure level in 
annual reports. We also note that the control variables have similar signs as in the baseline 
model. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Recently, a new economic geography literature has focused on the impact of a firm’s 
geographic location on its financial behavior (e.g., Loughran, 2008; Almazan et al., 2010; 
John et al., 2011). On the one hand, it has been argued that distance adversely affects 
investors’ ability to monitor managerial investment decisions in remotely located firms, 
which exacerbates monitoring costs by outside investors in these firms. On the other hand, 
the voluntary disclosure literature documents a strong link between agency costs and a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure decisions. Consistent with the agency theory prediction, voluntary 
disclosure mitigates the agency problem between insiders and external shareholders by 
providing these shareholders with information that contributes in reducing management 
oversight costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This study brings these two literatures together 
and examines how a firm’s geographic location affects its voluntary disclosure policy within 
the agency theory framework. 
 
Using a sample of 1,040 firm–year observations over the period 2007 to 2010, we 
examine the impact of a firm’s geographic location on the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of French listed firms. To measure the level of voluntary disclosure of our 
sample firms, we use a self-constructed index based on prior voluntary disclosure studies. We 
control for firm size, leverage, profitability, audit firm size, analyst following, cross-listing, 
liquidity, market-to-book ratio, and security issuance. We posit that decreased observability 
of managerial actions in remotely located firms leads to high oversight costs for outside 
investors and predict that remote firms are more likely to make voluntary disclosure as a way 
to reduce these costs. Consistent with our expectation, we find that as distance to the Paris 
region increases, corporate insiders are more willing to disclose information that allows a 
better understanding of their performance given that external monitoring of remote locations 
is too costly for outside shareholders. Our results are robust to alternative measures of 
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voluntary disclosure, to several geographic location proxies, and to a variety of alternative 
statistical approaches. 
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Appendix 1. Voluntary disclosure checklist 
Items of contents 
A–General corporate information 
1–Brief history of the company                                                            
2–Organizational structure/Chart                                                                                                   
3–General description of the business                                                                   
4–Main products/ services 
5–Main markets                                           
6–Market share of key products 
7–Statement of corporate general objectives 
8–Statement of financial objectives 
9–Annual report in English 
B–Corporate governance information 
B1–Shareholders 
1–Name of principal shareholders 
2–Ownership of principal shareholders 
3–Votes of principal shareholders 
4–Draft resolution of shareholders’ meetings 
5–Description of share classes 
6–The voting rights of each class of shares 
B2–Managers 
7–List of the senior managers (not on the board of directors) 
8–Picture of the senior managers 
9–Qualifications and biographical information of the management 
10–Age of the senior managers 
11–Number of shares owned by the management 
12–Number of votes owned by the management 
13–Reference to a code of best practices 
B3–Board of directors 
14– A list of board members (names) 
15– Picture of the board of directors 
16–Details about role of the board of directors at the company 
17–Appraisal of the board of directors 
18–Significant issues addressed during the year 
19–Information about the frequency of board meetings (dates) 
20–Attendance of board members at board meetings 
21–Information about the independence of board directors 
22–Qualifications and biographical information on board members 
23–Details about current employment/position of directors provided 
24–Details about previous employment/positions of directors provided 
25–Age of the directors 
26–Date of first appointment of board directors 
27–Start of current term of board directors 
28–End of current term of board directors 
29–Renewal of terms of office of directors 
30–Number of shares held by  board directors 
31–Number of votes held by board directors 
32–Identity of shareholders belonging to the board of directors 
33– Information about the directors dealing 
B4–Compensation Committee 
34–Existence of compensation committee 
35–The role and functioning of the compensation committee 
36–Significant issues addressed during the year 
37–The name of the members of the compensation committee 
38–Information about the independence of the compensation committee 
39–Number of meetings during the year 
40–Attendance of committee members at meetings of committee 
41–Basis for determining salary 
42–Type of performance evaluation: formula based or subjective 
43–General performance measures disclosed (e.g., financial, individual) 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
44–Specific performance measures disclosed (e.g., ROA, Operating income) 
45–Weight assigned on performance measures 
46–Discuss the decision–making process of directors’ pay 
47–Specifics of directors’ salaries disclosed (numbers) 
48–Form of directors’ salaries disclosed (cash, shares, etc.) 
49–Discuss the decision-making process of managers’ (not on board) pay 
50–Numbers of managers’ (not on board) salaries disclosed 
51–Form of managers’ (not on board) salaries disclosed 
52–Information about stock option programs 
B5–Audit committee 
53–Existence of an audit committee 
54–The role and functioning of the audit committee 
55–Significant issues addressed during the year 
56–The names and qualifications of  the audit committee  members 
57–Statement on independence 
58–Number of committee meetings 
59–Attendance at committee meetings 
60–Other internal audit functions besides audit committee 
B6–External Audit  
61–The names of the auditing firms 
62–Date of appointment of current auditors 
63–Expiration date of term 
64–Information about renewal of terms 
65–Auditors’ remuneration 
C–Financial information 
C1–Accounting information 
1–Balance sheet of past 2 years 
2–Cash flow statement of past 2 years 
3–Turnover of past 2 years 
4–Sales of key products 
5–Summary of financial data of previous years 
6–Summary of key ratios over at least three years 
7–Dividend policy 
8–Earnings per share 
9–Audit or report 
10–Financial calendar  
C2–Stock price information 
11–Historical share prices 
12–Current share price 
13–Share prices trend 
14–Stock price performance in relation to stock market index 
15–Market capitalization at year end 
16–Trend of market capitalization 
17–Foreign stock market listing information 
C3–Forward-looking information 
18–Sales forecast 
19–Forecasted market share 
20–Cash flow/Turnover forecast 
21–Earning estimates 
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Appendix 2. Variables’ definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Variables used in the baseline model 
DSCORE The total disclosure score computed as the total information disclosed/ maximum 
possible information score for each firm. 
GSCORE The governance score computed as the total governance information disclosed/ 
maximum possible governance information score for each firm. 
FSCORE The financial score computed as the total financial information disclosed/ maximum 
possible financial information score for each firm. 
DISTANCE Logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. 
ROAD DISTANCE Logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. 
OUTSIDE_PARIS Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is located outside the Paris region and 
zero otherwise. 
SIZE Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of firm total assets in euros. 
LEVERAGE Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. 
ROA Firm profitability calculated as the ratio of income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets (Return on assets). 
BIG4 Dummy variable equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one Big Four 
accounting firm, and zero otherwise. 
ANALYST Number of analysts following the firm. 
XLIST Dummy variable equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero 
otherwise. 
LIQUIDITY Liquidity measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities.  
MB MB is firm growth measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. 
ISSUE Dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the 
two years following year t, and zero otherwise. 
Panel B: Robustness check variables 
LNDSCORE The natural logarithm of the total disclosure score.  
LNFIN The natural logarithm of the governance disclosure score. 
LNGOV The natural logarithm of the financial disclosure score. 
ADSCORE The industry-adjusted total disclosure score computed as the total score for each firm 
minus the average total score for its industry. 
ADGOV The industry-adjusted governance disclosure score computed as the governance score 
for each firm minus the average governance score for its industry. 
ADFIN The industry-adjusted financial disclosure score computed as the financial score for each 
firm minus the average financial score for its industry. 
DISTANCE100 Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located more than 100 kilometers to the 
Paris region, and zero otherwise.  
DISTANCE250 Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located more than 250 kilometers to the 
Paris region, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1. Sample description 
Panel A. Industry classification of the sample firms using Campbell’s (1996) classification 
 
Industry  SIC code Number of firms Percentage 
Petroleum 13, 29 0 0 
Consumer durables 25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57 46 17.69 
Basic industry 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33 26 10 
Food and Tobacco 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54 24 9.23 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 6 2.31 
Capital goods 34, 35, 38 27 10.38 
Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 4 1.54 
Unregulated utilities 46, 48 9 3.46 
Textiles and trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 24 9.23 
Services 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89 78 30 
Leisure 27, 58, 70, 78, 79 16 6.15 
Total 260 100 
 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
Maximum 
Dependent variable       
DSCORE 0.39 0.13 0.04 0.30 0.41 0.49 0.70 
GSCORE 0.42      0.15      0.05      0.31      0.42      0.52       0.80 
FSCORE 0.31      0.11      0.00      0.24 0.33      0.38      0.67 
Location measures       
DISTANCE(in kilometers) 195.27 224.45 0.00      0.00      26.25 385.65 697.20 
ROAD DISTANCE(in 
kilometers) 
234.67 271.09 0.00      0.00      34.50 462.00 943 
OUTSIDE_PARIS 0.48      0.50      0.00      0.00      0.00      1.00      1.00      
Control variables       
SIZE 11.79 1.73 4.00 10.68 11.71 12.88 17.17 
LEVERAGE 1.40 18.32 –7.55 0.13 0.41 0.89 585.99 
ROA 2.13 16.55 –292.71 0.63 3.84 6.82 64.81 
BIG4 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ANALYST 4.91 4.18 0.00 1.00 4.00 8.00 26.00 
XLIST 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LIQUIDITY 1.71 1.36 0.30 1.06 1.37 1.86 9.94 
MB 1.74 1.76 –0.89 0.76 1.25 2.07 10.97 
ISSUE 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Notes: This table presents characteristics of the sampled firms showing their distributions across industries 
using Campbell’s (1996) classification (Panel A). It also provides summary statistics of variables used in the 
study (Panel B). DSCORE is the total disclosure index computed as the ratio of the total number of items 
disclosed to the maximum possible score. GSCORE is the governance disclosure index computed as the ratio of 
the total number of items disclosed to the maximum obtainable score. FSCORE is the financial disclosure index 
computed as the ratio of the total number of items disclosed to the maximum obtainable score. DISTANCE is 
computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. ROAD DISTANCE is 
natural logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. OUTSIDE_PARIS is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the firm is headquartered outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. SIZE is 
computed as the natural logarithm of firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to 
common equity. ROA is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary item divided by total 
assets. BIG4 a dummy variable equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting 
firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the firm. XLIST a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY 
measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. MB is firm growth measured as the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity 
securities in the year t or the two years following year t, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2. Pearson and Spearman correlations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
(1) DSCORE  0.095***  0.096***   0.082*** 0.365*** 0.131*** 0.018*** 0.118*** 0.151*** 0.162*** –0.064 0.089*** 0.179*** 
(2) DISTANCE 0.120***    0.994***   0.861***   –0.027   0.074** –0.010 –0.025   –0.034   0.032    0.097***   0.023    0.002    
(3) ROAD DISTANCE 0.126*** 0.994***  0.858***   –0.033    0.073**   –0.009   –0.024   –0.033    0.039    0.097***   0.024    0.003    
(4) OUTSIDE_PARIS 0.106***   0.905*** 0.889***  0.004 0.110*** –0.000 –0.027 0.020 0.018 0.107*** 0.010 0.005 
(5) SIZE 0.367*** –0.023 –0.03 –0.001  0.367*** 0.134*** 0.019 0.217*** 0.132*** –0.151*** –0.045 0.078** 
(6) LEVERAGE 0.042 0.034 0.059 0.082*** 0.314***  –0.145*** 0.126*** 0.038 0.042 –0.385*** –0.031 0.264*** 
(7) ROA 0.041 0.002 0.005 0.021 0.259*** –0.011  –0.018 0.014 0.017 0.164*** 0.367*** –0.132*** 
(8) BIG4 0.116*** –0.034 –0.034 –0.027 0.015 –0.023 –0.011  –0.122*** –0.036 –0.159*** –0.015 0.042 
(9) ANALYST 0.169*** 0.001 –0.007 0.034 0.233*** –0.016 –0.023 –0.132***  0.194*** –0.060* 0.063** 0.125*** 
(10) XLIST 0.160*** 0.052 0.056* 0.018 0.103*** –0.006 0.021 –0.036 0.258***  –0.004 0.062** 0.091*** 
(11) LIQUIDITY –0.031 0.052 0.103*** 0.096*** –0.139*** –0.044 0.033 –0.168*** –0.054* –0.014  0.153*** –0.154*** 
(12) MB –0.022 –0.001 –0.021 –0.021 –0.136*** 0.198*** 0.106*** –0.039 0.076** 0.027 0.087***  0.021 
(13) ISSUE 0.173*** 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.097*** 0.008 –0.067** 0.042 0.152*** 0.092*** –0.118*** 0.021  
Notes: This table reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation (below and above the diagonal respectively) matrix, which provides the correlation coefficients between disclosure score, geographic location 
measures and control variables. DSCORE is the total disclosure index computed as the ratio of the total number of items disclosed to the maximum possible score. GSCORE is the governance disclosure index 
computed as the ratio of the total number of items disclosed to the maximum obtainable score. FSCORE is the financial disclosure index computed as the ratio of the total number of items disclosed to the 
maximum obtainable score. DISTANCE is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. ROAD DISTANCE is natural logarithm of one plus road distance in 
kilometers to the Paris region. OUTSIDE_PARIS is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is headquartered outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. SIZE is computed as the natural logarithm of 
firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary item divided by total assets. BIG4 a dummy variable 
equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the firm in year t. XLIST a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. MB is firm growth measured as the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the two years following year t, and zero otherwise.  The 
superscripts asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Geography and voluntary disclosure: Univariate evidence 
Geographic location measures Below Median Above Median P–value of difference 
Panel A: Voluntary disclosure based on geographic location measures 
 
DISTANCE_D Mean 0.3812 0.4088 (0.00)*** 
     
ROAD DISTANCE_D Mean 0.3825 0.4069 (0.00)*** 
     
OUTSIDE_PARIS Mean 0.3815 0.4085 (0.00)*** 
     
Firm characteristics Below Median Above Median P–value of difference 
Panel B: Voluntary disclosure based on firm characteristics 
   
SIZE Mean 0.3585 0.4306 (0.00)*** 
     
LEVERAGE Mean 0.3804 0.4088 (0.00)*** 
     
ROA Mean 0.3899  0.3993 (0.23) 
     
Big4 Mean 0.3815 0.4111 (0.00)*** 
     
ANALYST Mean 0.3919 0.3976 (0.47) 
     
XLIST Mean 0.3916 0.5335 (0.00)*** 
     
LIQUIDITY Mean 0.4007 0.3946 (0.12) 
     
MB Mean 0.3824 0.4068 (0.00)*** 
     
ISSUE Mean 0.3866 0.4549 (0.00)*** 
     
Notes: This table presents results from univariate tests that compare the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
group of firms inside the Paris region (DISTANCE_D = 0; ROAD DISTANCE_D =0; OUTSIDE_PARIS = 0) and 
those outside the Paris region (DISTANCE_D =1; ROAD DISTANCE_D = 1; OUTSIDE_PARIS = 1). 
DISTANCE is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. ROAD 
DISTANCE is the natural logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. DISTANCE_D is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the variable DISTANCE is above its median and zero otherwise. 
ROAD DISTANCE_D is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the variable ROAD DISTANCE is above its 
median, and zero otherwise. OUTSIDE_PARIS is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is headquartered 
outside the Paris region and zero otherwise. DSCORE is the total disclosure index computed as the ratio of the 
total number of items disclosed to the maximum possible score. SIZE is computed as the natural logarithm of 
firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA is firm profitability 
measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. BIG4 a dummy variable equals one if 
firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed 
as the number of analysts following the firm in year t. XLIST a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
shares are traded on foreign markets and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of current assets 
over current liabilities. MB is firm growth measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the two 
years following year t, and zero otherwise. The P–value of the t–test of equality is reported in parenthesis and 
the asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Geography and voluntary disclosure: multivariate analysis 
 DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DISTANCE 0.0099*** 0.0099*** 0.0085***       
 (6.8775) (5.7247) (6.6605)       
ROAD DISTANCE    0.0101*** 0.0103*** 0.0083***    
    (7.1332) (6.0634) (6.5547)    
OUTSIDE_PARIS       0.0494*** 0.0497*** 0.0422*** 
       (6.8335) (5.6709) (6.2207) 
SIZE 0.0300*** 0.0307*** 0.0169*** 0.0301*** 0.0308*** 0.0169*** 0.0302*** 0.0309*** 0.0170*** 
 (9.7953) (9.4628) (6.3852) (9.8321) (9.5065) (6.3848) (9.7740) (9.4935) (6.3704) 
LEVERAGE –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0003*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0003*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0003*** 
 (–7.0782) (–5.6156) (–7.5873) (–7.1245) (–5.6611) (–7.5677) (–7.1165) (–5.6360) (–7.5000) 
ROA –0.0004 –0.0006** 0.0005*** –0.0004 –0.0006** 0.0005*** –0.0004* –0.0007*** 0.0004** 
 (–1.5705) (–2.4814) (2.6023) (–1.6010) (–2.5152) (2.6079) (–1.7159) (–2.6305) (2.3908) 
BIG4 0.0319*** 0.0425*** –0.0043 0.0320*** 0.0426*** –0.0043 0.0313*** 0.0419*** –0.0049 
 (4.7359) (5.3186) (–0.6406) (4.7557) (5.3419) (–0.6395) (4.6251) (5.2210) (–0.7218) 
ANALYST 0.0019* 0.0022* 0.0005 0.0020* 0.0022* 0.0005 0.0017* 0.0019 0.0003 
 (1.9012) (1.8497) (0.5072) (1.9579) (1.9028) (0.5512) (1.6579) (1.6304) (0.3096) 
XLIST 0.0764*** 0.0861*** 0.0352 0.0751*** 0.0846*** 0.0344 0.0835*** 0.0932*** 0.0413 
 (2.6753) (2.8946) (1.0878) (2.6252) (2.8440) (1.0621) (2.9942) (3.2065) (1.3097) 
LIQUIDITY –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0007*** –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0007*** –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0007*** 
 (–1.5859) (–0.1446) (–6.1686) (–1.6117) (–0.1635) (–6.1364) (–1.4374) (–0.0849) (–6.2974) 
MB 0.0104*** 0.0137*** –0.0033 0.0104*** 0.0137*** –0.0034 0.0103*** 0.0137*** –0.0034 
 (3.0799) (3.5255) (–1.0636) (3.0746) (3.5256) (–1.0864) (3.0685) (3.5390) (–1.0724) 
ISSUE 0.0406*** 0.0454*** 0.0226** 0.0408*** 0.0456*** 0.0229** 0.0412*** 0.0460*** 0.0232** 
 (4.4940) (4.0977) (2.3552) (4.5232) (4.1187) (2.3800) (4.4664) (4.0853) (2.4141) 
Intercept –0.1197** –0.1309** 0.0954** –0.1244** –0.1369** 0.0943** –0.1069** –0.1183** 0.1067** 
 (–2.3704) (–2.2416) (2.1252) (–2.4660) (–2.3471) (2.0938) (–2.1030) (–2.0256) (2.3761) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Adj. R2 0.2724 0.2375 0.1405 0.2749 0.2404 0.1396 0.2700 0.2360 0.1380 
Notes: This table reports the results of the pooled OLS estimation on the relation between geographic location and the voluntary disclosure level. All reported t–values in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009).  DSCORE is the total disclosure index computed as the ratio of the total number of items disclosed to the maximum possible 
score. GSCORE is the governance disclosure index computed as the ratio of the total number of items disclosed to the maximum obtainable score. FSCORE is the financial disclosure index computed as the ratio of 
the total number of items disclosed to the maximum obtainable score. DISTANCE is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. ROAD DISTANCE is the natural 
logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. OUTSIDE_PARIS is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is headquartered outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. SIZE is 
computed as the natural logarithm of firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets. BIG4 a dummy variable equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the firm in year 
t. XLIST a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. MB is firm growth 
measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the two years following year t, and zero 
otherwise. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in all regressions. The superscripts asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Alternative measure of the dependent variable: the natural logarithm of the disclosure score 
 LNDSCORE LNGOV LNFIN LNDSCORE LNGOV LNFIN LNDSCORE LNGOV LNFIN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DISTANCE 0.0298*** 0.0297*** 0.0262***       
 (6.6370) (5.6555) (6.0129)       
ROAD DISTANCE    0.0304*** 0.0306*** 0.0255***    
    (6.8449) (5.9137) (5.9083)    
OUTSIDE_PARIS       0.1461*** 0.1489*** 0.1335*** 
       (6.6344) (5.7354) (5.8062) 
SIZE 0.0899*** 0.0819*** 0.0714*** 0.0901*** 0.0822*** 0.0714*** 0.0904*** 0.0825*** 0.0720*** 
 (9.9281) (8.7381) (7.8489) (9.9685) (8.7773) (7.8485) (9.8730) (8.7722) (7.8149) 
LEVERAGE –0.0011*** –0.0010*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** –0.0010*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** –0.0009*** –0.0013*** 
 (–7.9692) (–6.2236) (–8.8627) (–8.0068) (–6.2674) (–8.8559) (–7.8481) (–6.1787) (–8.8732) 
ROA –0.0006 –0.0014 0.0022*** –0.0006 –0.0014 0.0022*** –0.0007 –0.0015 0.0021*** 
 (–0.5813) (–1.4536) (2.9939) (–0.5997) (–1.4771) (3.0033) (–0.6993) (–1.5982) (2.8094) 
BIG4 0.0887*** 0.1136*** –0.0049 0.0890*** 0.1138*** –0.0049 0.0868*** 0.1117*** –0.0065 
 (4.2366) (4.7568) (–0.2104) (4.2560) (4.7788) (–0.2092) (4.1234) (4.6547) (–0.2801) 
ANALYST 0.0029 0.0036 0.0016 0.0031 0.0038 0.0018 0.0022 0.0029 0.0010 
 (0.9824) (1.1197) (0.4948) (1.0384) (1.1733) (0.5350) (0.7450) (0.8939) (0.3082) 
XLIST 0.1929*** 0.2084*** 0.0887 0.1889*** 0.2040*** 0.0863 0.2141*** 0.2294*** 0.1072 
 (2.6419) (2.9707) (0.8565) (2.5839) (2.9082) (0.8321) (3.0019) (3.3520) (1.0644) 
LIQUIDITY –0.0012* –0.0002 –0.0023*** –0.0012* –0.0002 –0.0023*** –0.0011* –0.0001 –0.0022*** 
 (–1.8669) (–0.2258) (–6.4763) (–1.8935) (–0.2465) (–6.4710) (–1.7035) (–0.1547) (–6.4647) 
MB 0.0218** 0.0310*** –0.0141 0.0217** 0.0310*** –0.0143 0.0215** 0.0309*** –0.0142 
 (1.9960) (2.5988) (–1.2786) (1.9890) (2.5958) (–1.2980) (1.9845) (2.6127) (–1.2790) 
ISSUE 0.1220*** 0.1329*** 0.0906*** 0.1226*** 0.1335*** 0.0913*** 0.1239*** 0.1347*** 0.0922*** 
 (4.7118) (4.6433) (2.8756) (4.7407) (4.6658) (2.8998) (4.6709) (4.6087) (2.9064) 
Intercept –2.5019*** –2.4050*** –2.1923*** –2.5163*** –2.4220*** –2.1962*** –2.4611*** –2.3683*** –2.1621*** 
 (–17.2372) (–15.1977) (–15.2195) (–17.3611) (–15.3204) (–15.2103) (–16.7863) (–14.9142) (–14.9707) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Adj. R2 0.2469 0.1982 0.1701 0.2495 0.2010 0.1695 0.2436 0.1968 0.1696 
Notes: This table reports the results of the use of natural logarithm of the disclosure score as the dependent variable using the pooled OLS. All reported t–values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009). LNDSCORE is the natural logarithm of the total disclosure score. LNGOV is the natural logarithm of the governance disclosure score. 
LNFIN is the natural logarithm of the financial disclosure score. DISTANCE is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. ROAD DISTANCE is the natural logarithm of 
one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. OUTSIDE_PARIS is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is headquartered outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. SIZE is computed as the 
natural logarithm of firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. BIG4 a 
dummy variable equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the firm in year t. XLIST a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. MB is firm growth measured as the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the two years following year t, and zero otherwise. Year dummies and 
industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in all regressions. The superscripts asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Alternative measure of the dependent variable: Industry-adjusted score 
 ADSCORE ADGOV ADFIN ADSCORE ADGOV ADFIN ADSCORE ADGOV ADFIN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DISTANCE 0.0066*** 0.0121*** 0.0073***       
 (4.5680) (5.5799) (5.6251)       
ROAD DISTANCE    0.0069*** 0.0125*** 0.0071***    
    (4.8723) (5.8564) (5.5442)    
OUTSIDE_PARIS       0.0279*** 0.0506*** 0.0346*** 
       (3.9496) (4.5809) (5.1827) 
SIZE 0.0248*** 0.0146*** 0.0166*** 0.0249*** 0.0147*** 0.0167*** 0.0247*** 0.0143*** 0.0165*** 
 (9.0311) (4.2625) (6.6547) (9.0715) (4.3055) (6.6689) (8.9344) (4.1455) (6.5431) 
LEVERAGE –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0003*** 
 (–8.3204) (–6.3225) (–9.3640) (–8.3891) (–6.3781) (–9.3178) (–8.2931) (–6.2541) (–9.3209) 
ROA –0.0001 –0.0003 0.0005*** –0.0001 –0.0004 0.0005*** –0.0001 –0.0004 0.0005*** 
 (–0.4235) (–1.0665) (2.7164) (–0.4427) (–1.0903) (2.7165) (–0.4713) (–1.1064) (2.5962) 
BIG4 0.0311*** 0.0380*** –0.0045 0.0312*** 0.0381*** –0.0045 0.0306*** 0.0370*** –0.0050 
 (4.3890) (3.4488) (–0.6591) (4.4058) (3.4655) (–0.6589) (4.3000) (3.3433) (–0.7303) 
ANALYST 0.0022** 0.0048*** 0.0003 0.0022** 0.0049*** 0.0004 0.0020** 0.0045*** 0.0001 
 (2.2046) (3.3574) (0.3347) (2.2517) (3.4222) (0.3750) (2.0235) (3.1041) (0.1376) 
XLIST 0.0748*** 0.0269 0.0411 0.0735*** 0.0247 0.0403 0.0804*** 0.0372 0.0471 
 (2.9540) (1.1607) (1.3527) (2.8996) (1.0654) (1.3220) (3.2091) (1.6089) (1.5968) 
LIQUIDITY –0.0004** –0.0006** –0.0006*** –0.0004** –0.0006** –0.0006*** –0.0004** –0.0005** –0.0006*** 
 (–2.4108) (–2.1338) (–5.9290) (–2.4416) (–2.1671) (–5.8976) (–2.2848) (–1.9781) (–6.0020) 
MB 0.0077** 0.0154*** –0.0049 0.0076** 0.0153*** –0.0049* 0.0077** 0.0154*** –0.0048 
 (2.2791) (2.6130) (–1.6320) (2.2688) (2.5969) (–1.6540) (2.2882) (2.6337) (–1.5935) 
ISSUE 0.0438*** 0.0369** 0.0221** 0.0439*** 0.0372** 0.0223** 0.0441*** 0.0374** 0.0224** 
 (4.6929) (2.4676) (2.2429) (4.6990) (2.4845) (2.2618) (4.7221) (2.4796) (2.2835) 
Intercept –0.3701*** –0.2577*** –0.2181*** –0.3734*** –0.2631*** –0.2194*** –0.3584*** –0.2357*** –0.2073*** 
 (–11.5686) (–6.2597) (–7.4115) (–11.6777) (–6.3997) (–7.4355) (–11.2090) (–5.6676) (–7.0191) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Adj. R2 0.2095 0.0978 0.1177 0.2117 0.1006 0.1170 0.2042 0.0889 0.1146 
Notes: This table reports the results of the use of the industry-adjusted disclosure score as the dependent variable using the pooled OLS. All reported t–values in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009). ADSCORE is the industry-adjusted total disclosure score. ADGOV is industry-adjusted governance disclosure score. 
ADFIN is the industry-adjusted financial disclosure score. DISTANCE is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. ROAD DISTANCE is the natural logarithm 
of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris region. OUTSIDE_PARIS is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is headquartered outside the Paris region, and zero otherwise. SIZE is 
computed as the natural logarithm of firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets. BIG4 a dummy variable equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the 
firm in year t. XLIST a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. MB is 
firm growth measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the two years following 
year t, and zero otherwise. Year dummies are included in all regressions. The superscripts asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. Alternative geographic location proxies 
 
 
 DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DISTANCE100 0.0479*** 0.0489*** 0.0392***    
 (6.6106) (5.6190) (5.6910)    
DISTANCE250    0.0429*** 0.0425*** 0.0375*** 
    (5.9764) (4.9552) (5.4642) 
SIZE 0.0295*** 0.0303*** 0.0164*** 0.0290*** 0.0297*** 0.0160*** 
 (9.6866) (9.3784) (6.2415) (9.4952) (9.1946) (6.0430) 
LEVERAGE –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0003*** –0.0004*** –0.0004*** –0.0003*** 
 (–7.0794) (–5.6125) (–7.4554) (–7.3400) (–5.8384) (–7.4234) 
ROA –0.0004 –0.0006** 0.0005*** –0.0003 –0.0006** 0.0005*** 
 (–1.5258) (–2.4630) (2.5835) (–1.3575) (–2.2940) (2.6900) 
BIG4 0.0310*** 0.0415*** –0.0052 0.0336*** 0.0441*** –0.0028 
 (4.5667) (5.1788) (–0.7632) (4.9352) (5.4683) (–0.4190) 
ANALYST 0.0017* 0.0019 0.0003 0.0019* 0.0021* 0.0004 
 (1.6723) (1.6378) (0.3250) (1.8399) (1.7901) (0.4589) 
XLIST 0.0832*** 0.0929*** 0.0411 0.0815*** 0.0912*** 0.0395 
 (3.0227) (3.2303) (1.3134) (2.9733) (3.1746) (1.2669) 
LIQUIDITY –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0007*** –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0007*** 
 (–1.4628) (–0.0869) (–6.1652) (–1.5226) (–0.1018) (–6.1084) 
MB 0.0099*** 0.0132*** –0.0038 0.0100*** 0.0133*** –0.0037 
 (2.9542) (3.4378) (–1.2063) (2.9843) (3.4586) (–1.1701) 
ISSUE 0.0405*** 0.0453*** 0.0227** 0.0402*** 0.0450*** 0.0222** 
 (4.4062) (4.0306) (2.3660) (4.3187) (3.9631) (2.3113) 
Intercept –0.0955* –0.1076* 0.1180*** –0.0861* –0.0969* 0.1238*** 
 (–1.9088) (–1.8614) (2.6574) (–1.7195) (–1.6790) (2.7702) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Adj. R2 0.2682 0.2354 0.1339 0.2620 0.2294 0.1318 
Notes: This table reports the results of the use of alternative measures of the geographic location using the pooled 
OLS. All reported t–values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the firm level (Peterson, 2009). DISTANCE100 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is located more than 
100 kilometers to the Paris region, and zero otherwise. DISTANCE 250 is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm is located more than 250 kilometers to the Paris region, and zero otherwise.  SIZE is computed as the 
natural logarithm of firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA 
is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. BIG4 a dummy 
variable equals one if firm’s accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. 
ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the firm in year t. XLIST a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of 
current assets over current liabilities. MB is firm growth measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or 
the two years following year t, and zero otherwise. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) 
classification are included in all regressions. The superscripts asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
40 
 
Table 8. Alternative statistical approaches 
 
 Fama MacBeth Fama MacBeth with Newey–West standard errors Firm random effects 
 DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE DSCORE GSCORE FSCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DISTANCE 0.0099*** 0.0098*** 0.0087*** 0.0099*** 0.0098*** 0.0087*** 0.0099*** 0.0099*** 0.0085*** 
 (22.9646) (22.3251) (28.4099) (22.3431) (23.1446) (30.7125) (7.0455) (5.8752) (6.3197) 
SIZE 0.0301*** 0.0309*** 0.0171*** 0.0301*** 0.0309*** 0.0171*** 0.0300*** 0.0307*** 0.0169*** 
 (12.8048) (9.8060) (15.4868) (12.0316) (9.3986) (19.9314) (12.8525) (11.0075) (7.5372) 
LEVERAGE –0.0014** –0.0015* –0.0010 –0.0014** –0.0015** –0.0010 –0.0004** –0.0004* –0.0004* 
 (–3.4209) (–3.1215) (–1.1652) (–4.5881) (–5.5078) (–1.2291) (–2.1622) (–1.8375) (–1.9406) 
ROA –0.0003 –0.0006* 0.0005* –0.0003* –0.0006** 0.0005** –0.0004* –0.0007** 0.0005** 
 (–1.7244) (–2.7124) (2.7201) (–2.9193) (–3.6088) (4.4261) (–1.7838) (–2.5429) (2.1411) 
BIG4 0.0332*** 0.0442*** –0.0046 0.0332*** 0.0442*** –0.0046 0.0315*** 0.0417*** –0.0043 
 (16.0736) (20.7493) (–1.6720) (16.6631) (30.3875) (–1.7719) (4.5081) (4.9917) (–0.6473) 
ANALYST 0.0020** 0.0023** 0.0004 0.0020** 0.0023** 0.0004 0.0017* 0.0018* 0.0005 
 (3.4742) (3.8451) (0.5662) (3.3779) (3.9243) (0.5383) (1.9060) (1.6737) (0.5532) 
XLIST 0.0615* 0.0766** –0.0039 0.0615** 0.0766*** –0.0039 0.0847*** 0.0990*** 0.0349 
 (3.0462) (4.4377) (–0.0665) (4.0022) (8.1933) (–0.0678) (3.3686) (3.2907) (1.4431) 
LIQUIDITY 0.0023 0.0038 –0.0013** 0.0023 0.0038 –0.0013* –0.0004 –0.0002 –0.0007** 
 (0.7560) (0.9065) (–3.3001) (0.8953) (1.0488) (–3.1786) (–1.2411) (–0.4042) (–2.2112) 
MB 0.0102*** 0.0135*** –0.0033 0.0102*** 0.0135*** –0.0033 0.0079** 0.0099*** –0.0031 
 (5.8992) (8.7453) (–1.3835) (6.8067) (11.3018) (–1.3948) (2.5537) (2.6867) (–1.0415) 
ISSUE 0.0419*** 0.0471*** 0.0224 0.0419*** 0.0471*** 0.0224* 0.0414*** 0.0471*** 0.0226** 
 (18.6795) (7.4144) (2.3366) (36.7225) (7.8971) (2.4049) (3.7785) (3.5917) (2.1480) 
Intercept –0.1140** –0.1176** 0.0914*** –0.1140** –0.1176** 0.0914*** 0.0125 0.0208 0.1144*** 
 (–5.1903) (–4.5899) (6.3611) (–4.9976) (–4.3136) (6.9184) (0.3874) (0.5382) (3.6862) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Adj. R2 0.2873 0.2425 0.1794 0.2873 0.2425 0.1794 0.2710 0.2217 0.1585 
Notes: This table reports the results of the alternative statistical approaches: Fama–MacBeth estimation (Columns 1–3); Fama–MacBeth estimation with Newey–West standard errors (Columns 
4–6), and firm random effect estimation (Columns 7–9). DSCORE is the total disclosure score. GSCORE is the governance disclosure score. FSCORE is the financial disclosure score. 
DISTANCE is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. SIZE is computed as the natural logarithm of firm total assets. LEVERAGE is calculated as 
the ratio of total debt to common equity. ROA is firm profitability measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. BIG4 a dummy variable equals one if firm’s 
accountants are certified by at least one BIG4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. ANALYST computed as the number of analysts following the firm in year t. XLIST a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm’s shares are traded on foreign markets, and zero otherwise.  LIQUIDITY measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. MB is firm growth measured as the 
ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. ISSUE a dummy variable equals one if the firm issues debt or equity securities in the year t or the two years following year t, and zero 
otherwise. Industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in all regressions. Year dummies are included in columns 7–9. The superscripts asterisks *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
